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RESTRAINTS ON THE POWER OF ALIENATION.
That A, in imparting to B a short estate, e. g. for five years,
in land, may validly prohibit B's alienating it, whether by sublease or assignment, is a commonplace. Whether, if the estate
imparted is for the life of B, a denial to B of the power to aliene
during his lifetime is good, may be doubtful. It is not doubtful
that the same result may be substantially accomplished by the
device of a trust. If it is desired to give B all the benefits of land
other than that of converting it into money, it may be conveyed to
X in trust for him. But, it is probably necessary that X should be
clothed with active duties, unless the destination of the remainder
were contingent. Otherwise, the trust would be adjudged "dry,"
and would be executed, that is, annulled. It seems to be necessary
that the trustee's will and judgment should, to a degree, displace
those of the cestui que trust. In other words, an arrangement
even by form of trust, with a view to making land inalienable for
the life of the beneficiary, will not be tolerated unless it also contemplates a still further reduction of the ordinary power of a life
owner. He cannot lose the power to convey, unless he loses
more power. But, if the settler or creator is willing to take from
him more power, he is permitted to take from him also the power
to aliene.
The motive of this attitude of the law it is difficult to detect,
unless it be that persons will be more ieluctant to create estates
without both the power of transfer and also the power of control,
than they will be to create estates without the power of transfer
merely, and therefore, that the number of estates of the former
class will be comparatively few.
A method of securing to B the use of land for his life, with(75)
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out conferring upon him the power to dispose of it after his death
has been for centuries recognized. The courts have not forbidden
the formation of what are known as life-estates, even though the
persons who are to take the land after their expiration are indeterminate, perhaps even as yet noii-existent, and therefore, for
the time, the future interest is inalienable. Land can be devised
or conveyed to A for life, with remainder to such persons as
shall, at his death be the children of B who is still childless.
Neither A nor any body else can transfer the remainder..
-It is permissible to convey land to A for life, and the remainder to such of his children as shall survive him, although
until his death only the life estate and not the remainder, is alienable. It would be permitted to convey the remainder to his surviving children, and as representing their parent, the children of
his deceased children. In many cases, these would be A's heirs
so that virtually the conveyance would be to A for life with remainder to his heirs.
By a singular rule however, while land may be conveyed to
A for life, with remainder to persons, who in a great proportion
of cases will be his heirs, and the remainder will not be disposable
by him, if the remainder is conveyed to exactly the same persons
as will be his heirs, that is, if they are designated not by their
sonship, or grandsonship, brotherhood or cousinship, etc., but by
their being heirs, general, or of the body, by their relationship
under the law of descent, as successors to the ownership, the
power of disposing of the remainder is conferred on the lifetenant. No mischief sufficiently grave to pr9duce the law's antagonism to an estate for life in A, with remainder to such definite
male or female issue as would be heirs, exists, but if the remainder is to issue generally, something has occurred that
awaken's judicial repugnance. The remainder is denounced out
of existence. The whole estate is given to the life-tenant in order that he may be able to dispose of it. The so-called Rule in
Shelly's Case has emerged.
When land is deeded to A and his heirs, we have long understood that it is not deeded to the heirs at all; but to A alone. The
words "and his heirs" which seemed to couple with it other recipients of the land did no such thing. There was but one
recipient. Those words only told how large the estate was,
which he was taking. It was a heritable estate. It might have
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been supposed where land was granted or devised to A for his
life, with remainder to his heirs, that these words had the same
signification. They expressed the intentionof the grantor simply
to pass to A a fee. This is not the explanation of the Rule in
Shelly's case. That rule works the increase of the life-estate into a fee, how clear soever the grantor's intention that it shall be
merely a life-estate. What then is the motive of the Rule?
Is it hostility to any life estates? No! for these have not
all been abolished.* That being so, it cannot be hostility to remainders, for if there are life estates, t-here must be remainders,
or reversions.
Is it hostility to the sequence of a remainder in A's as yet indeterminate relatives; in his surviving children for instance, to a
life-estate, in A? No, for we have just seen that such sequence is
not probitited.
The object of the rule seems to be to avoid the too great multiplication of life estates, that is, of estates whose existence is
inconsistent with the desposability of the land itself, i. e., of the
maximum estate in land. If land could be really devised or conveyed to A for life only, but with remainder to such persons as,
at his death, would under the definition of the interstate law, be
his heirs, it might become the fashion to convey lands in this
way, and in consequence, a large part of the lands of the state
would be always practically inalienable. The life tenant could
sell only his life-estate. The heir often could not sell until 21
years after the life tenant's death. The aim of the Rule in Shelly's
Case is to preserve a large degree of alienability.
A grant to A and his heirs, if it has not the power to convey
the iand during his life, is for most purposes a grant to him for
life, with remainder to his heirs. It is even more objectionable
than a life estate with remainder, for the life estate can be sold,
if the remainder cannot; while an inalienable fee, implies that
even the virtually included life estate is inalienable. It is not
surprising then, that in a jurisprudence which has invented the
Rule in Shelly's Case, it should be held that in a grant of land in
fee to A, with a prohibition against alienation during the life of
A, the prohibition is void. This doctrine is clearly enunciated
in Walker v. Vincent,' where, a will devising "to. my daughter
119 Pa. 369 Cf. Nauglee's Appeal, 33 Pa. 89; Williams v. Leech, 28 Pa'
89; Cressler's Estate, 16i Pa., 427; McIntyre v. McIntyre 123 Pa. 329.
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* * * and to her legal heirs," the addition "all of which
etc. I give and devise to my said daughter * * and to her
heirs forever, with this express condition and provision that
she shall not alien or dispose of the same or join in any deed or
conveyance with her husband for the transfer thereof during her
natural life; but the same shall be and remain during the period
aforesaid inalienable," was declared to be void. The daughter,
it was held, could contract to convey in fee. The law however,
was not always so understood in Pennsylvania. In McWilliams
v. Nisley', Gass conveyed to his son-in-law McWilliams and his
heirs a piece of land adjoining a piece on which he, Gass, lived
subject to the restriction that he "is not to sell" it "during the
natural life of the said William Gass" unless the said Gass shall
sell the land he now lives on. Tilghman C. J., expressed the
opinion that the restriction might endure 'during the life of any
person in existence at the time of making the will; adding "That
is enough for the present purpose; for there is no restraint in this
deed, beyond the lifeof James McWilliams." [the grantee.] The
doctrine of this case must be regarded as no longer law.
In Kaufman v. Burgert,2 a devise in fee was qualified by a
proviso that the farm should not be liable to sale for debts, and
that the devisee should not sell or dispose of it; but that it should
"go and vest in his heirs, unless he shall devise the same by his
last will and testament, which he is authorized and empowered
hereby to do." He was held to be able to make a valid conveyance in fee.
The reason assigned for decisions of this sort is not always
logical. A good reason would be that to allow a suspension of
the power to alienate during the life of the first taker, would
frustrate the policy of the rule in Shelly's Case, the policy,
viz, of not allowing the sequence upon a life estate of an estate
in fee to the very same persons as would be heirs of the life
12 S. & R. 5o6.
Pa. 274. A similar decision occurs in Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466;
Reifsnyder v. Hunter 19 Pa. 41. In McCullough v. Gilmore, ir Pa. 370, the
2195

giftby will was to William who was enjoined "not to leave the same to any but
the legitimate heirs of his father's family, at his decease." It was held
nevertheless, that his testamentary direction to sell the land was valid. The
restraint on the power of devise was void. Cf. also, Sprankle v. Commonwealth, 2 Walker, 420,

THE FORUM.
tenant. The reason sometimes assigned is different. It is that
a "power of alienation is necessarily and inseparably incident to
an estate in fee." 1 If it is "inseparably incident," it cannot be
separated not merely for life2 but for any shorter time. If an
estate can be a fee, although for five years, or ten years or fifteen
years, the owner of it cannot aliene it, it is clear that alienability
does not need to attend it all the time.3
The legal validity of a restriction on the power of aliening a
fee for a comparatively short time, has been not infrequently
recognized. 4 In Yost v. Insurance Company' it is assumed by
McCullom J., that a restriction for thirteen. years, that is, until
the devisee should reach the age of 30 years, was valid. it is impossible to state with precision for how long such a restraint
would be tolerated. Perhaps its permissible length is not absolute, but dependent on circumstances, some circumstances or
purposes justifying a longer disability than others.
It has also been intimated that while a general inalienability
Would not be suffered, a restraint against aliening to a particular
person would be, but no case applying the principle is now recalled. "A partial restriction, such as not to alien to a particular
person or for a limited time, may be supported." 6 But a prohibition against selling to anybody except X, or his heirs, even for
life only, would probably be inadmissable. It has been held by
a learned court that under a devise to "my son William * * *
he shall not be at liberty to sell or dispose of the same to any
other person than to my son John or his heirs, as long as they are
in possession of said farm," the restraint against alienation is not
permissible and William could sell the farm to a stranger during
John's ownership of his farm, but the objection apparently was
that the restriction was to last beyond John's life, and so long as
'Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466.
it might under McWilliams v. Nisly,

2
As
3

2 S.

& R. 5o6.

in Libby v. Clark, i18 W. S. 25o, cited by McCullom J., iu Yostv Ins.
Co. 179 Pa. 381, a restriction for five years was held not inconsistent with a

fee simple.
4

McCullough v. Gilmore, ii Pa. 370; Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466;
Kaufman v. Burgert, 195 Pa. 274.
5179 Pa. 381.
6
Kaufman v. Burgert z95 Pa. 274, Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466; McCullough v. Gilmore, xi Pa. 370; Williams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 5o6.
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his farm should be owned by his heirs.' "This implies" says
Endlich J., "a restriction enduring not only for the life of any
person in existence at the time of the making or taking effect of
the will, but for an entirely indefinite time. The provision
therefore, does not fall within the diclum of McWilliams v. Nisly,
sujira" etc.
When a class is defined to one of whom, only, the land is to
be alienable, an independent objection to the restriction would be
the vagueness of the class. A prohibition on leaving the land at
A's death "to any but the legitimate heirs of his father's family"
would be void, probably, because of the impossibility of determining whom the heirs of the father's family would comprise.!
'Hartman v. Herbine, 7 Pa. C.C. 630.
"McCullough v. Gilmore, ii Pa. 370. Cf. Hartman v. Herbine, 7 Pa. C.
C. 630.
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MOOT COURT
JOHN GRAYBILL vs. FARMERS BANK.
Payment by Check-What Constitutes Acceptance by Bank.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
George Fox owing Graybill $250, presented him in payment his check
for that amount upon the Farmers'Bank. Graybill telephoned to the bank
to know if it would pay Fox's check for $25o. The cashier replied by telephone "yes." Graybil then accepted that check and gave Fox a receipt of
payment of the debt. Four hours later, Graybill offered the check to the
bank for payment but instead of his being paid, was told that Fox had notified the Bank not to pay and had also by another- check withdrawn his
whole deposit. This is assumpsit for $250.
Paul Smith for the plaintiff.
When check payable to bearer is certified thesum mentioned in it must
necessarily cease to stand to credit of the depositor. It passes to the credit
of the holder of the check and is specifically appropriated to pay it when presented: Girard Bank vs. Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. 92.
Unless expressly provided otherwise by statute no special manner of accepting or certifying a check is necessary. But any words or expressions
intended to mean acceptance by the bank is sufficient whether signed or
not: Espy vs. Cincinnati Bank, 18 Wall 604; Pierce vs. Kitterdge, I 5 Mass.
374.
The bank was estopped from denying the certification of the check by
its cashier, though done verbally: Morse vs. Mass. Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes
(U. S.) 209.

Davis for the defendant.
The bank's contract is with the depositor and not with the check holder,
until the check is presented and accepted: Taylor vs. Bushing, loo Pa.
23; Northumberland First National Bank vs. McMichael, io6 Pa. 46o.
A check is simply an order which may be countermanded and payment
forbidden by the drawer any time before it is actually cashed or accepted:
L. R. A. VoL. 31, p. 656.
The Act of May io; 1881, provides, "that no person shall be charged as
an acceptor on a bill of exchange, draft or order drawn for payment of
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money exceeding $20, unless his acceptance be in writing signed by himself
or his lawful agent."
OPINION OF THE COURT.
TOBIN, J.:-The only question for the determination of the court is,
whether a telephone communication promising to pay a certain check constitutes such a certification as will make the bank liable therefor, although
the drawer has in the meantime stopped payment The decision of this
point depends entirely upon the construction to be placed on the act of May
io, 188i, P. L. r7; P. & L. Dig. pages 346 and 2196, which enacted: "that no
person within this State shall he charged, as an acceptor on a bill of exchange, draft or order drawn for the payment of money exceeding twenty
dollars, unless his acceptance shall be in writing, signed by himself or his
lawful agent." "A check," says Randolph on Commercial Paper "is a bill of
exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand." He further remarks,
"it presupposes funds of the drawer in the hands of the bank or banker
drawn upon." If the paper in this case is to be regarded in effect a bill of
exchange, then as it is for the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, there
could be no recovery under the act of May io, 1881 as there was no written
acceptance.
It has been decided that where a national bank upon which a check is
drawn telegraphs through its cashier to another bank in response to an inquiry, that the check is good and will be paid, and the second bank relying
upon the telegram cashes the check, the bank upon which the check was
drawn cannot justify its subsequent refusal to pay the check, on the ground
that the drawer had in the meantime stopped payment: Farmer's Bank v.
Elizabethtown Bank, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. z72. In Brinkman v. Hunter, 73
Mo. 172, it was held that a telegiam of a defendant is a promise in writing
within the statute of the state of Missouri relating to the acceptance of bills
of exchange. A check by a depositor on his account certified by the bank
becomes an obligation of the bank to the payee or holder, and in the absence
of fraud or similar exceptional circumstances the amount is as much with
drawn from the depositor's account as if the money had been paid out over
the'counter: Central Guarantee, Trust& Safe Deposit Co. vs. White, Zo6 Pa.
611. A promise made through the medium of a telegram to pay a draft is
the legal equivalent of an acceptance in writing required by the act of May
io, 1881: Ravenwood Bank vs. Renecker, x8 Pa. Superior Ct. 192. In that
case the the court said:. "The same legislative motive which led to the enactment of the statute of frauds and perjuries bears fruit in this legislation:
the purpose was to free certain classes of contracts from the uncertainty involved in establishing them by oral evidence. The legislature made no
attempt to prescribe what covenants should constitute an acceptande; it
did determine that the only legal evidence of such contract shall be in writ
ing signed by the party or his agent." Bouvier defines a check to be "a written order or request, addressed to a bank or persons carrying on the business
of banking, by a party having money in their hands, desiring them to pay,
on presentment, to a person therein named or a bearer, or to such person or
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order, a named sum of money." Anderson's Law Dictionary defines a check
to be "an order on a bank to pay the holder a sum of money at the bank, on
presentment of the order and demand of the money." The paper upon
which this suit is brought is an order for the payment of money exceeding
twenty dollars and there is no evidence that the bank on which it was drawn
accepted it in writing. The act is plain in its terms, and is a flat bar to a
recovery in this action. Judgment is, therefore, rendered for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The act of 19ox declares that "the acceptance [of a bill] must be in
writing and signed by the drawer;" and it furrher declares that when a check
is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, "the certification is equivalent
to an acceptance." These make no essential change in the act of May ioth,
1881, except in respect to checks, etc., for sums not as large as S2o.
The evil of rules such as this, is strikingly displayed in this case. Graybill was unwilling to receive Fox's check until he was assured that it would
be paid. He could not at the moment go to the bank and present it for acceptance. He relied on the telephone. The bank assured him by the telephone that the check would be paid, having every reason to believe that
he was about to take the check in some business transaction. The rule
requiring a writing, makes the use of the telephone impracticable; for despite the bank's assurance that the check would be paid, and the purchase of the check, in dependence thereon, by Graybill, the bank has
since allowed Fox to withdraw his deposit, and declines to pay the check.
It often happens that in attempting to avoid one mischief another is incurred, and the new mischief is not necessarily less in gravity than the old.
Doubtless the banking interest prefers the rule which makes a writing indispensable, but, as in the case before us, the particular bank may take advantage of it, to perpetrate an odious wrong upon the person who has unsuspectingly trusted it.
Judgment affirmed.

BARNES vs. NESBIT.
Parol agreement to sell land-Effect of agreement-Measure of damagesStatute of Frauds.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Barnes orally contracted to sell a house and lot to Nesbit for $1,500.
Barnes made the deed and tendered itat the time agreed, upon. Nesbit refused to receive it, unless Barnes would reduce the price to $t,oo. He had
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never intended to pay more than $1,2oo, and had supposed that if Barnes
went so far as to make a deed and got in sight of the $1,200, he being in
need of money would accept that amount. The house and lot would not
bring at a fair competitive sale more than $1,200.
Assumpsit (a) for the purchase money $i,5oo, (b) for the difference between $i,2oo and $1i,5oo and the cost of the deed, $xo.
Memolo for the plaintiff.
Penna. Statute of Frauds does not absolutely avoid a parol contract for
sale of land: Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424; Hartv. Carroll, 85 Pa. 5o8. Measure of damages is the consideration that passed between theparties, whether
contract executed or executory; McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. 23; Ewing etux. v. Thompson's Adm., 66 Pa. 382.
Cohen for the defendant.
Plaintiff cannot recover purchase price: Hertzog, v. Hertzog. 34 Pa. 418;
Hastings v. Eckley, 8 Pa. 197. Measure of damages would be the difference between price agreed upon and market price, at time of agreement:
Bowser v. Cessna, 92 Pa. 148.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
P. SMITH, J.:-It is well settled law in Pennsylvania that a parol
contract for the sale of lands cannot be specifically enforced as that falls
within the Penna. Statute of Frauds: Act March 21, 1772; Tripp et. al. vs.
Bishop, 56 Pa. 424, 1867; unless there is a continued, notorious, exclusive
possession subsequent to or contemporaneous with the oral contract, with
the boundaries distinctly ascertained: Myers vs. Byerly, 45 Pa. 368, 1863.
But the rule is that the offended party has his remedy in an action of assumpsit where he will recover the damages he has sustained by the breach
of the parol contract: Haines vs. O'Connor, io Watts. 313, 1840. The
reason for this rule is that.the provisions of the first three sections of 29 Ch.
2, c. 3, condensed by our statute into one section-first section Act of March
21, 1772, .merely operate upon the estate.
Pennsylvania has not reenacted
the fourth section of 29 Ch. 2, c. 3, which provides that no action may be
brought on an unexecuted parol contract for purchase or sale of lands. So.
although our Statute of Frauds requires every contract for an estate in lands
exceeding a lease for three years to be in writing: Haslet v. Haslet, 6 Watts
464, 1837; it does not avoid a verbal executory contract for sale of land as
the English statute does, but leaves it binding upon the parties and simply
restrains its effect. The Penna. Act limits the operation of the contract in
passing and creating an estate or interest in land, leaving the party who refuses to perform it liable to be sued by and to respond to the other party in
damages: Allen's Estate, i W. &. S. 383, 1841; Bell vsAndrews, 4 Dall. 152;
1796.
But what damages is Barnes entitled to recover in this action? Manifestly not the $1,50o, for that would practically result in carrying the contract into effect notwithstanding our Statute of Frauds: Ellet v. Paxson, 2
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W. & S. 018, 1841. The rule as to damages has been laid down as the loss
sustained by the non-fulfillment of the contract: Ellet vs. Parson supra; or
such damages as under the circumstances of the case appear reasonable:
Ewing vs. Tees, i Binn. 450, 18o8; Wilson vs. Clarke, I W. & S. 554, 1841.
What are reasonable damages? What is the loss sustained by the
plaintiff? When the vendee has brought the action against the vendor for
the non-fulfilllment of a parol contract for the sale or conveyance of land, the
rule is laiddown byWoodward J., that the measure of damages is the amount
of purchase money paid with interest and the expenses; or if no part of the
purchase money has been paid, the expenses and trouble incurred by the
vendee in endeavoring to procure title. The vendee cannot in addition,
where there is no fraud on the part of the vendor, recover damages for the
loss of his bargain: Dumars vs. Miller,34 Pa., 319, 1859. The same doctrine
is found in Hertzog vs. Hertzog's Admr. 34 Pa. 48, 1859. Thevendee could
only get nominal damages for loss of his bargain, because a purchaser is
not entitled to any compensation for the fancied goodness of his bargain
which he may suppose that he has lost, where the vendor is without fraud
incapable of making title on his part: McClowry vs. Croghan's Admr., 32
Pa. 23, 1859. But in case fraud can be shown on part of the vendor then
vendee can make him responsible for all loss he can show that he has sustained by such refusal of the vendor to preform the parol agreement: Allen's
Estate, supra.
When the vendor brings the action to recover damages for breach of a
parol contract for sale of lands against the vendee, as in this case, the rule
seems to be that it is not necessary to show fraud on the part of the vendee
in order to get as damages the difference between the price agreed upon and
the marketvalue of the land at the time of the breach together with the expenses incurred. In Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 147, x869, when Cessna refused to take land at his bid made at a public sale, beyond that the Court
held that while it may be true that the specific performance of a contract
cannot be enforced or, what would amount to the same thing-that the whole
of the purchase money could not be recovered from the vendee-still the
vendor was entitled to recover the full amount of his loss and damages by
reason of the vendee's refusal to take the land at his bid, and that the
amount of the vendor's loss was manifestly the difference between the market
value and the price bid together with the cost of deed and expenses incurred.
In Ellet vs. Paxson the damages were held to be the price agreed upon deducting the market value. Here it was also decided, that it was no answer to
say that party agreed to give more than the property was worth. CL Meason
vs. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335.
With these decisions as precedents, we hold in this case that the measure of damages for the breach of the parol contract by the vendee, Nesbit, is the difference between the price offered by Nesbit $1,5oo and the
market value of the land, $1,200 together with the cost of the deed $xo,
making a total amount of damages due to Barnes, the plaintiff, of $31o; and
thus we direct jury to find.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The first section of the statute of frauds enacts that "all leases, estates,
interests of freehold * * * made or created * * * by parol and not
put in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating the same
* * * shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only" etc.
Nesbit then acquired by the lease no right to take and retain possession of the
land for any period against the, dissent of Barnes. On the other hand it would
equitably follow that Barnes could not compel Nesbit to pay the consideration mentioned in the contract or any part of it. The contract would furnish
no guide to the compensation for use and occupation, should Nesbit take
possession for a time, unless the interest on the purchase money for the time
of occupation should be assumed to be the compensation.
To compel Nesbit to pay the purchase money agreed upon would be to
convert the contract from one for a tenancy at will, into one for a sale of the
fee. Though yielding but a sullen respect for the statute, the courts have
not had the hardihood so far to defy it.
But, to allow the vendor retaining the land, on the vendee's refusal to
accept a conveyance, to recover the difference if any between its market
value at the time the vendee should have accepted it and the price he agreed
to pay, is palpably equivalent to allowing him to enforce the contract. A
part of the price agreed upon, he takes in the land, whose value is appraised
in money by the jury. The balance he takes in money. Were the contract
"specifically" performed, he could get all in money.
Occasionally the courts have been perspicacious enough to detect and
candid enough to concede that to allow the recovery of the difference between the value of the land and the price is equivalent to allowing specific
performance of the contract: Carner & Johnston v. Peters, 9 Super. 29: and
in Sausser v. Steinmetz,'88 Pa. 324, where a parol lease for five years
had been made, and the lessee refused to accept possession, it was held that
to permit the lessor to recover a sum equal to the rent for one year, because
the lessor had been unable to obtain another tenant, would be equivalent to
specifically executing the contract. If the lessor had been able to procure a
tenant for $9oo, half of the rent agreed upon, to allow him to recover the other
$goo would also be the same as specific execution.
Nevertheless, the courts have inconsequently held, that the vendor may
sell the land a second time, and compel the first vendee to pay any difference between the price he had agreed to pay, and the price obtained at the
second sale. They tell us that while to compel the vendee to pay in money the
whole price would be to enforce the contract, and to defy the statute of frauds,
to allow the vendor to convert the land, for the vendee, into cash, and to look
to the vendee for any deficiency is permissible: Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa.,
148; Ewing v. Tees, xr Binn. 450. Cf. Ashcom v. Smith, 2 P. & W. 211.
Tompkins v. Haas, 2 Pa. 74.
The courts moreover, allow the vendor, after the vendee has refused to
accept the land, to retain it and recover from the vendee the difference be-
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tween its actual value, at the time when the vendee ought to have accepted
it, and the price that he agreed to pay: Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418.
Atlhough then, to compel the parol vendee to pay the difference between the market value of the land and the higher price that he agreed to
pay first, is virtually the same thing as to compel him to pay the whole price
and, accepting the land, to sell it himself and thus recover back a portion of
what he has paid the vendor the court below acted prudently in deterring to
the decisions cited by it which must be provisionally accepted as expressing
the law.
Affirmed.

THRALL vs. SHELDON.
Evidence of Act of 1887.

Surviving Party to Contract.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thrall recovered a judgment against Sheldon for $4,000. He then died
.bequeathing the judgment to his sister, Sarah Thrall. She then died appointing Hart her executor. Hart has since died. Sheldon is, dead having
bequeathed his personal property to his nephews, William, John and Jacob.
This is sci. fa. to revive the judgment. The nephews were offered to prove
payment of $i,ooo to Sarah Thrall and $1,oo to her executor. The Court
excluded them. Judgment for Plaintiff for $4ooo and interest.
Keenan for the appellant.
Interested persons may testify in favor of the estate of deceased party
to a contract'in action: Carpenter v. Ins. Co., i61 Pa. 9; Toomey's Estate,
x5O Pa., 535.

Thompson for the defendant.
Where both parties represent dead persons, the death of each works the
incompetency of all persons interested in the estate of the other: Crosetti's
Estate, 211 Pa., 490; Trickett on Witnesses, sec. 217. Words "Thing or contract in action" may be used in sense that it is the subject matter, alone or in
conjunction with other matters: Trickett on Witnesses, sec. ioo.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COHEN, J:-John Thrall recovered a judgment against Philip Sheldon
for $4,000, He then died bequeathing the judgment to his sister, Sarah
Thrall. She died appointing Hart her executor. Hart has since died.
Sheldon is dead having bequeathed his personal property to his nephews,
William, John and Jacob. This is a sci. fa. to revive the judgment. The
nephews were offered to prove payment of $s,ooo to Sarah Thrall and
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1,ooo to Hart. The court excluded them. Judgment for the plaintiff for
$4,ooo and interest.
The facts do not show who made the payment in question, nor do they
show whether Sheldon died before or after Sarah Thrall and her executor.
We do not however consider that fact important to the decision of this case.
The only question in the case is whether the nephews were competent
witnesses to prove the fact of these two alleged payments.

Clause (e) of the Act of r887, provides, inter alia, that where a "party to
a thing or contract in action is dead * * * * and his right thereto has passed by his own act or the act of the law, to a party on the
record, any surviving or remaining party to such thing or contract in action,
or any person whose interests shall be adverse to the right of the deceased,
shall be incompetent to testify to any matter occurring before the death of
the deceased. Under the common law, witnesses were held incompetent for
many reasons, which reasons are now swept away or greatly modified. Incompetency under our present law is a rare exception, and its tendency is
toward competency as far as is reasonable and just.
The act of 1887, merely retains some of the common law restrictions.
The object of clause (e) is that when death seals the lips of one of the parties
to "the thing or contract in action," the law prohibits the other party to the
"thing or contract in action" who is opposed to the interest of the deceased,
from testifying to any matter which occurred during the lifetime of the deceased, for the purpose of equalizing evidential matters.
It says "opposed to the interest of the deceased." What deceased?
Can it mean the interest of John Thrall, which would make him the deceased? If such were the meaning intended by the clause, and as it only
makes a witnese incompetent to matters which transpired before the death
of the deceased, then it is evident that the court should have allowed the
nephews to testify, because the paymentswere made after the death of John
Thrall. But we believe such is not the construction which can be placed upon this clause.
In Crosetti's estate, 211 Pa., 490, a controversy between the executor
of the deceased husband on one side, and the administrator of the deceased wife on the other, involving the question of ownership of the whole
estate, there beingtwo parties to the action, and both being dead, and their
interests having passed to personal representatives on the record, the daughter was offered in support of her mother's estate, to prove a gift of the
money by the father to the mother. The court in considering clause (e)
said, "What deceased? The answer is obvious. Any deceased party to the
subject in controversy whose right thereto or therein has passed to a party
on the record, who represents his interest. It follows, therefore that if the
executor of Christopher Crosetti had brought this action, Christopher
Crosetti must be considered within the meaning of the act as a deceased
party interested in the thing or contract in action. In his lifetime he had a
right to controvert the alleged gift to his wife, and as his lips are sealed by
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death, and Louisa Ritahatta, being interested in sustaining the administration of her mother's estate, against the executor of her father, was incompetent to testity to any matter alleged to have occurred during the lifetime
of her father."
To hold otherwise would be to make the death of one litigant more
potent in working incompetency than the death of the other.
What deceased? Any deceased whose right has passed to the party
on the record. It is obvious that it is not the interest of John Thrall.
His right, it is true, passed to Sarah, and it is alleged that a payment of
$ i,ooo was made to her, and as her lips are closed from controverting this
matter, and her right passed to her executor, Hart, to whom it is alleged
another payment of $rooo was made for which his estate would be liable if
the evidence be admitted and his lips likewise being sealed, and the right
passing to the executor d. b. n, the plaintiff in this action, it is self evident
that the deceased par.ties here are Sarah and Hart. Therefore the court below was right in excluding the nephews from testifying to the alleged payments.
The judgment of the court below.is affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The judgment, by Thrall's bequest, belonged to Sarah Thrall. She dy
ing, Hart became her executor. Hart is now dead. This is scirefaciasby
Sarah Thrall's administrator d. b. n. c. t. a., to revive the judgment. The
executor of Sheldon is the defendant. The defendant seeks to prove (a) a
payment of $i,ooo to Sarah Thrall, and (b) a payment of another $i,ooo to
Hart, her executor.
It is clear that the nephews of Sheldon cannot testify to the payment
made to Sarah Thrall. They would be testifying in support of their interest
which is adverse to that of Sarah Thrall, to a fact that occurred before her
death.
They were offered also, to prove a payment made to Hart, the executor
prior to his death. The present plaintiff does not claim through Hart. He
is the administrator d. b. n. of Sarah Thrall and her rights have passed to
him as fully as they had, for the time, passed to his predecessor in the trust.
In testifying, the nephews of Sheldon will not reduce any right of Hart. He
is to be considered as a trustee, or agent for the creditors and legatees of
Sarah Thrall, and it has been decided that the death of an agent with whom
X has had a transaction, does not preclude X from testifying in any litigation with the principal involving that transaction, in respect to it: Ins. Co.
v. Shultz, 82 Pa. 96; Seigeant v. Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 341. A trustee or executor
is like an Lgent and his death does hot close the mouth of the person with
whom, as such trustee or executor he has dealt: Norristown Trust Co. v.
Lentz, 30 Super. 408.

It is true that the administrator d. b. n.may compel Hart to account for
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the $i,ooo, but neither the testimony delivered in the proceeding nor the decree, will fasten the liability upon Hart.
Decree reversed.

SHADEL'vs. THROOP.

Commissions-Brokers-Divergence from prescribed Terms
-Liability.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Throop owning a house told Shadel that he would sell it for $4000.00,
commissions for procuring a purand would give him (Shadel) $50o.o0
chaser who would pay the price in cash. Shadel found Allison who was
willing to pay $4,00o.oo, but only $2,oo0.oo in cash, the rest in two years, to
be secured by a mortgage. Throop accepted Allison's terms and the conveyance and mortgage were made. Throop denying his liability to Shadel,
offers him $ioo, which declining to accept, he sues for $5oo.
Clark for the plaintiff.
When a stock broker brings the attention of a buyer lto property which
he has for sale, and the owner subsequently negotiates the transfer, the
broker is entitled to a commission: Gibson's Estate, 161 Pa. 177; Keys v.
Johnson, 68 Pa. 42.
Sorber for the defendant.
An agent may be entitled to a qutanfum zernit: Stoy on Agency, s.
329; Martin v. Sillman, 53 N. Y. 6L5; Gillespie v. Wilder, 99 Mass. i7o.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DAVIS, J.:-Brokers are persons whosebusiness it is to bring the buyer
and seller togetha.r. They need have nothing to do with the negotiation of
the bargain. But they must prove that their agency was the procuring cause
of the sale.
If vendors were permitted to employ brokers and agents to look up
purchasers, and call the attention of buyers to the property which they desired to sell, and then while such purchasers were negotiating, take the
matter into their own hands, and avail themselves of the labor, services and
expenses of the broker or agent in bringing the property into market and to
accomplish a sale by an abatement in the price and yet refuse to pay the
broker a fair compensation, an injustice would be inflicted.
Shadel could not find a purchaser, up to the time of the sale who would
pay $4,000 cash. But he secured, a purchaser, who would pay the above
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amount, but on easier terms. Throop accepted the purchaser, thereby ratifying the act of his agent. Throop was satisfied with AUison and the terms
under which he was willing to purchase, It was through the exertions of
Shadel that Throop was brought into business relations with the purchaser.
He received as much for his property as the stipulated price with Shadel
called for, but only on different terms which I dcn't think alters the case,
for the terms were satisfactory to Throop. The principal, Throop, accepted
Allison as readily as he would have accepted a cash purchaser. Shadel was
the procuring cause of this sale and is entitled to his commission, notwithstanding the fact that the sale was made upon terms different from those
upon which he was authorized to negotiate.
Judgment for plaintiff for $500 with interest.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The contract between Throop and Shadel is that the former would pay
the latter $500 for procuring a purchaser who would pay, cash, $4,000. It is
plain that, if Shadel found X willing to buy at $4,000 only $2,00o of which
should be paid in cash the rest being payable in two years, Throop would
not have been bound to accept X nor would he have been bound to pay
Shadel anything.
But X, being found, negotiates with Throop. Does the fact thatX has
been brought to Throop by Shadel, make it impossible for Throop to make
any contract of sale AMith X, however material the divergence of its terms
from those prescribed to Shadel, without obliging himself to pay the $5oo?
There are cases that hold apparently that Throop must have no dealings with X, after he finds that he will not comply with the terms, or rather,
that if h does, he must pay Shadel for the opportunity thus furnished
him. In Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42, A employed B to find a buyer for
$16,ooo. C was found by B, and sent to A. but he declined to pay $16,ooo.
Instead he offered to transfer to A, in exchange for A's land, a house, and
A accepted the offer. He thereby became
to give A in addition $2,00o.
liable to pay some compensation to B. It does not appear that the rate had
been fixed by the contract or that, if it had, the compensation given, was of
that rate. The principle of the decision is that if B, acting under a contract with A, sends C to A, and A takes advantage of the act to make any
sale, or exchange, he must pay B something.
In Seaburg v. Fidelity Ins. etc. Co., 205 Pa. 234, the exact commission
stipulated for was recovered by the broker, although the prescribed terms
of the sale, were materially deviated from, in the arrangement actually entered into between the vendor and the vendee, and this deviation was necessary in order to induce the vendee to make the bargain.
If, after the agent procures a purchaser who is ready to buy on the designated terms, the vendor, for his own object, modifies them, he should be
held bound by his contract, to give the agent the commission agreed upon.
Is is not equally clear when he ic compelled to yield a portion of his in-

THEFORUM
tended demands, in order to induce the proposed vendee to buy and thus
entitle the agent to anything,that he should not be held to have entitled the
agent to eveiything? The contract is that if B procures for A a certain
advantage, A will pay B $5oo. B does not procure A this advantage but
a less advantage. Why then should B receive as large a fee? Let us suppose that if the purchaser purchases on the terms laid down in A's contract
with his factor B, A will get an advantage worth $5,ooo; and that B, therefore has agreed to procure this advantage or askinothing. B does not procure this advantage. He makes it possible however by directing C to A,
for A to make a contract with C which will procure for him an advantage
worth $4,oo0.
A is not bound to accept this advantage. If he does not B
earns nothing. Why if A accepts it, shall we say that B earns what he
would have, had he obtained for A the advantage worth $5,oo0?
If A sells a chattel to B, which must. possess certain virtues, B's acceptance and retention of it although it does not possess those virtues, does
not compel him to pay the contract price. Neither should the acceptance
of the service of a factor, which is not as valuable as that which was sold to
the principal, compel the principal to pay the price agreed upon.
There are indeed good authorities for the principle that "A broker to
negotiate the sale of an estate is not entitled to his commission until he
finds a purchaser ready and willing to complete the purchase on the terms
Prescribedby the seller, and assented to by the broker:" Fraser v. Wycoff,
63 N. Y. 445. (Cf. McGavock v. Woodlief 20 How 2z2) and that a different
negotiation made between the vendor and the proposed vendee will not en.
title the factor to compensation.
Let it it not be said that there was no substantial difference between a
purchase for cash and one upon credit. If that were so, the logical result
would be that the vendor wvould be liable for the- broker's commission, although he refused to sell on credit. The lbroker agrees to obtain a pur
chaser for cash. He surely cannot compel the vendor to accept a vendee
who does not intend to pay cash.
We think that the jury should have been directed to find how much
less the service actually rendered by Shadel to Throop was worth than that
which he had agreed to render, and proportionately to reduce the $5oo compensation.
Judgment reversed.
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RUSSELL vs. HOWE.
Mortgage-Act of June 8th, 1881- -Ejectment.
Boyer attorney for plaintiff.
Davis attorney for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DUFFY, J.:-This case involves the construction and application of the
act June 8th, 1881 P. L. 84. Facts are as follows: Russell made a deed to
Howe and his heirs for $z5oo. At the same time Howe executed a paper in
which he said he had lent Russell $2500, and had received a conveyance of
lot, describing it, to secure the repayment of it and that when the sum with
interest was repaid, he would cancel the deed, and return it to Russel. Howe
delivered this paper to Russel, Later Russell made partial payments of
$200, $700, $900, $4oo and finally of the residue with interest.

Howe at last

payment did not have the deed at hand, but said he would cancel and return
t within three days. He has never done so though 2 years have elapsed,
and he declines to give up the possession of the lot. Russell brings ejectment.
Act June 8th, 188 P. L. declares: "Be it enacted, that no defeasance to
any deed for real estate regular and absolute on its face, made after passage
of this act, shall have the effect of reducing it to a mortgage, unless the said
defeasance is made at the same time the deed is made and is in writing,
signed, sealed, acknowledged and delivered by the grantee in the deed to
the grantor, and is recorded in the office for recording of deeds and mortgages in the county wherein the land is situated, within sixty days from the
execution thereof; and such defeasance shall be recorded and indexed as
mortgage by the recorder."
There is now but one method left by which a deed absolute on its face
can be reduced to a mortgage, and that method in this case, has not been
pursued. The act provides that the defeasance must not only be in writing,
and of the same date as that of the deed, but it must also be "signed, sealed,
acknowledged, and delivered by grantee in deed to grantor," but furthermore, it must be "recorded in office for recording of deeds and mortgages in
the county where the land is situated, within sixty days from the execution
thereof." If we are to give effect to this act, which is in nowise ambiguous,
it is certain the defeasance in this case can be of no effect, for it was neither
"sealed, acknowledged or recorded."
It is proposed in this case to impeach the deed by showing that itis not
what it purports to be, viz., a conveyance in fee, and to show that it was only a mortgage, and the question arises, how shall this be found? The statute
answers this by saying you can do this in no other way than by the exhibition of a written defeasance, "signed, sealed, acknowledged, delivered and
recorded."
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Courts have always insisted that evidence to impeach a deed shall be
clear and indubitable and as the legislature has seen proper to require,
for that purpose a still higher type of evidence, the Court cannot take on itself to destroy the enactment for the purpose only of saving a case supposed
to be a hard one: Sankey v. Hawley i8 Pa. 30. Provisions of Act June 8th
1881 P. L. 84 have admittedly not been complied with as defeasance has not
been recorded as required by its terms.
This construction has been placed on the act, and similar applications
of the doctrine have been made in a number of cases since Sankey v. Hawley,
supra. of which the following are examples: Loher v. Russel 207 Pa. io5;
O'Donnel v. Vandersall 213 Pa. 551.
The argument, and authorities quoted, by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff, while presenting an ingenuous scheme, are not in our opinion applicable, as the act presupposes the execution and recording to be separate and
distinct matters, as it names sixty days as the time which is allowed to
elapse between the "execution" and "recording."
The defeasance is invalid and judgment is given for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Legislation which is designed to prevent fraud is often the means by
which the grossest and most barbarous fraud maybe made successful. The
statute of frauds may-no one knows with certainty-have produced more
fraud than it has averted. Its provisions however, in this age of writing
are not unreasonable. It contents itself with requiring a writing signed by
the party to be affected by it. The act of June 8th, 188i goes absurdly beyond this. The defeasance must be made simultaneously with the deed.
Can any one say why? How can it matter, when the defeasance is to be enforced against him who executed it, whether he made it at the time the conveyance was made to him, or a year or five years later? A man may be
charged with a trust although when he makes the written declaration, years
have elapsed since the origination of it.
The -act of x88i requires that the defeasance be sealed. The seal is of
very little moment in modern law. An effectual conveyance of land can be
made without it. The declaration which renders a trust enforceable, need
not be sealed. Why in a state whose citizens have sense enough to live outside of the precincts of a mad-house, should it be ordained that if A conveys
to B as security for $ioo a piece of land with $20,000, the conveyance shall
be absolute if the written acknowledgment of B that it is defeasible
shall not have, after his signature, that odd mark which the gyrations of
a pen produced, known nowadays as a seal, but shall be defeasible if that
cabbalistic sign be present?
The acknowledgment of a deed is simply one way of proving its execution. An oral admission is made before a justice of the peace and he in
writing certifies to it. But an acknowledgment, equally explicit may have
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been made before twenty citizens who prove it; nay, it may be made in the
face of the court itself, in the trial which involves the efficacy of the defeasance, yet these -acknowledgments count for nothing. The conveyance is
absolute unless the defeasance has been acknowledged with a view to recording.
The defeasance counts for naught, though it is simultaneous with the
conveyance, though it is written, signed, sealed and acknowledged unless
within 6o days from its execution it is put on record. The land may be
worth ioo,ooo; the consideration for its conveyance may have been a loan
of $5oo. The grantee may most explicitly have declared in writing that he
received it as a security. Nevertheless, if the grantor from inadvertence,
negligence, unavoidable prevention, fails to put it on record within 6o days,
he loses the land. A deed is valid, as between the parties, though never recorded. A mortgage itself is between the parties, valid though never recorded. But if the conveyance is on one pi.ece of paper and the defeasance
is on another, the conveyance is good without record, but the defeasance
without record is bad, and even as between the parties!
Sankey v. Hawley, iY8 Pa. 30, is an example of the frightful wrong and
oppression of which by an unscrupulous man, this statute and the courts
which administer it according to the letter, may be made the instrument.
The case before us is another. Howe, the grantee, has distinctly acknowledged in writing, that he has received the conveyance merely as a security
for the repayment of a loan of $2,5oo. He has, in instalments received that
sum from Russell, in repayment of the loan, but has retained the deed.
When required to give back the land he brazenly and insolently sets up the
act of 88 x! And the courts often so ingenious in inventing evasions of
harsh and.cruel laws, acquiescingly accept the statute and enforce it according to the letter!
Not so did the judges with respectto the statute of frauds and perjuries.
They discovered reasons for exempting cases from its letter. Is the spirit
of equity dead? Or has it grown timorous before the awful authority of the
legislature? The chancellor invented his equitable exceptions to the statute
of frauds, even when he recognized the omnipotence of parliament. In this
age there is little scruple at declaring acts of assembly void on the ground
that they violate a constitution, yet this abominable statute is allowed to
work its evil will.
It would not have been difficult to annul this statute in so far as it requires a seal, an acknowledgment and a recording, on the ground that it interferes unduly with the right of possessing and protecting property: Constitution, Art. I, sect. x. The opportunity to do so has probably passed.
There is strident need that the legislature should at the earliest occasion,
amend the statute so as to eliminate from it its unreasonable features.
Judgment affirmed.
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STEPHENS v. TROLLEY CO.

Trolley Car-Negligence.

Van Scoten for plaintiff.
Skinner for defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Stephens was driving a wagon along the tracks of the defendant
company on a public street. The engineer of the car whistled as a signal
that he should turn out of the track. Not doing this and moving but slowly,
the engineer jumped from his car, took the horse by the bridle and turned
it out of the track, but negligently, so that Stephens, who was asleep, was
shaken from the wagon to the street. He brings this action for $iooo
damages.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHARMAN, J.:-John Stephens, the plaintiff in this action,was driving
along a highway which he had a perfect right to use, subject to that care
which everyone useing the public highway must exercise toward his fellow
travelers. The part of the highway on which he was driving could be used
by the public, since the public and the trolley company have a right of common user of the track; but the car has the superior right to which the traveler must yield on sight or notice, and it is the duty of each to be on the
lookout for the other, but the traveler must exercise the greater degree of
caution, on account of the trolley company having the superior right of
way.
In McKee v. The Harrisburg Traction Company, 211 Pa. 47, the court
said that rapidtiy of transit was no longer a mere convenience to a traveler,
but that it had become a matter of vital importance to the general business
of the community.
Stephens was sleeping when he was overtaken by the car, and on failing
to respond to the signals of the engineer, the engineer jumped from his car
and, in a negligent manner, turned the team from the track, thereby injuring
the plaintiff who now seeks ro recover from the trolley company.
Stephens certainly was negligent in his duty to the public, but we think
the case is ruled by Rudgeair v. The Reading Traction Company, i8o Pa.
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333, and Murphy v. The Philadelphia Rapid Traction Company, 30 Super.
87. In these cases the motormen left their cars, and in the first case, an
assault was committed on the driver of the wagon. In the second, the
motorman turned a horse from the tracks, in a negligent manner, and it was
ruled that the motormen were acting beyond the scope of their authority.
In the present case there is no evidence to show that the engineer was
doing the act under orders from the conductor or any officer of the company.
We, therefore, give judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The learned court below has undertaken to say, as matter of law, that
the act of the defendant's motorman in turning the plaintiff's horse from the
track, was not within the course of his employment. To this determination
we have two objections. Ordinarily, what is the scope of a servant's duty is
to be decided, not by the court but by a jury. But, even if the court could
can take judicial notice of the duties of a motorman, what must it assume to
be those duties? If he sees a stone or a child in the track, is it or not, his
duty to get out and remove it? If he discovers a vehicle in front of him, is
he or not to take steps to turn it off? Does he not owe to the passengers, the
adoption of reasonable means to bring them to their destination in a reasononable time? Rapidity of transit is not a mere convenience; "it has become
a matter of vital interest to the general business of the community:" Thane
v. Traction Co. 191 Pa. 249; McKee v. Traction Co. 211 Pa. 47. Is the
motorman not to promote this quick transit by causing the removal from the
track of obstacles to it?
Let it not be said that this duty appartains to the conductor. How can
the court know that it has been allotted by the company to him? It does not
appear that there was a conductor other than the person who was likewise
the motorman.
The learned court below has yielded to the authority of Murphy v.
Philadelphia Transit Co., 30 Super. 87, which, in turn, cites as its chief justtfication; Rudgeair v. Reading Traction Co. iSo Pa. 333. In the last case
the plaintiff complained of a violent assault upon him by the defendant's
motorman in resentment of the plaintiff's persistence in keeping on the trackso as to impede the progress of the car. "The principle respondant super)
ior," says the court, "has no application to such a purely personal trespass
as that disclosed by the evidence prepared." In Murphy v. Philadelphia
Transit Co., supra, A was delivering coal from a wagon, into a cellar. The
wagon and horse were standing perpendicularly to the side of the street so
that the horse's head would have been struck by an advancing car. A took
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hold of a crank ipn order to lower the wagon which'had been lifted so as to
shoot out the coal. To hasten matters, the motorman got off the car, took
hold of the horse, and started it ahead, causing the crank to escape from A's
hand, and revolving rapidly, to strike him in the face. The court reached
the conclusion that the motorman was not acting within the scope of his
dnty. We are unable to adopt this view.
It seems however, that the plaintiff was asleep when the accident occurred, and it wouldnot have occurred, had he been awake. For'a driver of a
wagon to be asleep, while he is driving on a public street, which is threaded
with a trolley road, and traversed by numberless vehicles and passengers, is in the highest degree careless, unless there were special justificatory
circumstances; which he should bring into view. He has shown none such.
His contributory negligence therefore, of which the court could in the state
of the evidence, take notice, required the non-suit.
Judgment affirmed.

